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In today’s Navy Medicine, an approach towards wireless networks is coming into 
view.  The idea of developing and deploying workable Wireless Local Area Networks 
(WLAN) throughout Naval hospitals is but just a few years down the road.  Currently 
Naval Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) are using wired Local Area Networks (LANs) 
throughout the infrastructure of each facility.   
Civilian hospitals and other medical treatment facilities have been experimenting 
with the concept of WLAN for the past few years.  The concept is not new within the 
Department of Defense.  The thought of utilizing wireless technology within a Naval 
MTF has been challenged by many different situations that have hindered its opportunity 
of arriving on the scene at an earlier time. 
The use of wireless technology within a Naval MTF is boundless at this time.  
With newer capabilities being developed every few months or so, the time grows closer 
when WLANs will be apart of normal day to day operations for medical staff, 
administrators, and executives within Navy Medicine. 
This thesis will take a look at the architecture of an 802.11x WLAN within a 
Naval MTF from a “macro” view.  It will observe the requirements and needs 
assessment, along with the pros and cons of wireless that drive Navy Medicine towards 
the development and deployment of wireless 802.11x technologies.  It will also review 
current technology, architecture, and policies that help in the decision making process.  
Last, this thesis will look at the cost benefits along with a developmental plan to help in 
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I. BACKGROUND/RELATED WORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify whether or not 802.11x Wireless Local 
Area Networks are a feasible alternative for Navy Medicine.  This is done by taking a 
look at the concept from a macro view to determine what the needs, requirements, and 
environments are to develop and deploy such a network throughout Naval Medicine.   
2. Research Questions 
The questions involved within this paper ask the basics of developing and 
deploying WLAN architecture.  It asks what are the needs and requirements for the 
deployment of an 802.11x WLAN within an MTF and what are the risks involved?  It 
also asks, “What is the architectural design for the development and deployment of an 
802.11x WLAN?”  Another question asked is what are the benefits associated with 
WLANs?  The last question asked is what policies are involved in deploying an 802.11x 
WLAN within a Naval MTF?  
3. Scope of Thesis 
The scope of this thesis looks at what an 802.11x WLAN can do for Navy 
Medicine.  It answers the question of whether or not it is cost effective, secure, 
interoperable, accessible, upgradeable, and capable of handling the day to day needs of a 
Naval MTF.  This is a broad brush stroke interpretation of an architectural design.  The 
scope takes a macro view of the overall design of Navy MTFs and looks at the policies, 
the needs and requirements, and the cost benefit of deploying these types of networks 
throughout.  This
thesis does not get into the smaller details of what specific brand of equipment to use.  
Each MTF is designed differently in regards to size and mission capability, thus 
equipment will be determined based on each facility.  It would not be feasible to draw out 
every design for each MTF, so the idea of developing a basic template to follow gives 
Chief Information Officers (CIOs) and other personnel guidelines for developing and 
deploying a WLAN in accordance with DoD policies. 
2 
B. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
1. DoD WLAN Practices 
Currently DoD is experimenting with the idea of using 802.11 x wireless within 
different areas of its operations.  Due to classified material, this thesis will not go into 
specific detail about some of the commands performing these operations.  Wireless 
networks utilizing 802.11x technologies are being deployed on some ships and at specific 
bases throughout.  These ships and bases are performing the beta tests for the rest of the 
fleet.  This will help in determining the vulnerabilities that may arise due to using radio 
frequencies to distribute data throughout large platforms.   
The limitation to all this is policy.  The DoD introduced a directive that discusses 
the use of wireless 802.11x technologies within the DoD Global Information Grid.  DoD 
8100.2, dated 14 APRIL 04, establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the use of 
commercial wireless devices, services, and technologies in the DoD Global Information 
Grid (GIG).1  It provides the guidelines for deploying and securing data that may be 
transmitted over the 802.11x frequency.  This data does not include any classified 
material due to the vulnerabilities that are inherited with 802.11x.   
COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA issued a moratorium on any wireless 
activity on Navy shore commands.  This message came out in July 2004.  Along with this 
message came another message that contained additional guidance for the moratorium.  
The second message states that “A. WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES THAT FALL 
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS MORATORIUM ARE AS FOLLOWS: A) THOSE 
THAT CAN PERMIT ACCESS TO NAVY INFORMATION SYSTEMS WITHOUT 
TRANSITING AN EXISTING WIRED NETWORK ACCESS INTERFACE FOR 
REMOTE CONNECTIVITY, B) THOSE THAT CAN PROVIDE ACCESS TO 
UNCLASSIFIED DATA STORED ON PORTABLE OR STATIONARY 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES, AND C) THOSE THAT DO NOT PROTECT THE 
PRIVACY AND INTEGRITY OF DATA IN TRANSIT (I.E. TRANSMITTING 
                                                 
1 Directive, Department of Defense, 8100.2. Use of Commercial Wireless Devices, Services, and Technologies in 
the Department of Defense (DoD) Global Information Grid (GIG). Pg. 1. April 14, 2004. 
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OFFICIAL EMAIL INFORMATION IN THE CLEAR WITHOUT APPROVED 
CRYPTOGRAPHY). PER PARA 4.1.2 OF REF D, EXCEPTIONS MAY BE 
GRANTED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS DETERMINED BY THE NAVY 
DAA.”2  This means that a wireless network can be implemented, but solid justification 
has to be in place in order for the Designated Approving Authorities (DAA) to honor 
such implementation.  The additional guidance message helps clarify what is covered in 
the original message regarding the moratorium.  Anyone with existing wireless 
devices/networks that are covered under current SSAA/IATO/ATO need to be registered 
by 30 Aug 2004.  Appendices C and D are the messages that were sent out. 
2. Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) WLAN Practices 
At the time of this paper the Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) does not have a 
policy designed for the deployment of wireless 802.11x technologies.  The concept is still 
new, and since there has been a prohibition to the use of this technology throughout the 
DoD GIG there has been no need to pursue it.  Now that the DoD Directive 8100.2 has 
been signed, BUMED will have a guideline that will help in the development/deployment 
of 802.11x WLAN architecture throughout the Naval Medical Training Facilities (MTF).   
3. Current MTF Network Architecture 
Currently, there is not an MTF WLAN architecture designed as a template for all 
of Navy Medicine to follow.  Permission is given to each practicing or experimenting 
entity via the Designated Approving Authority (DAA) of each command or region.  Only 
then should a command or person attempt to use wireless in a “business” capacity. 
4. Private Health Care WLAN Practices and Policies 
The common theme that has presented itself throughout all the articles reviewed 
for this paper is the need for portability, accessibility, redundancy, and security.  There 
are different variations to the types of wireless systems that are deployed throughout 
various hospitals within the private sector. 
                                                 
2 Naval Network Warfare Command. Subj: Additional Guidance for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 
Moratorium. MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA/-/JUL//. Last accessed July 2004. 
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Many hospitals that are using wireless are experimenting with the concept of the 
wireless access control gateway that allows authorized personnel to connect to the 
Intranet via a Virtual Private Network (VPN).   
There is not one company who provides for every need.  Each product comes with 
its own pros and cons.  Different vendors provide various pieces of the “pie” to help in 
operating and securing WLANs.   
 a. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
 (HIPAA) of 1996 
Every medical facility, including all DoD MTFs, has to comply with the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996.  Its design is to 
ensure the privacy and security of protected health information (PHI) over electronic 
mediums.  Now, wireless itself is not directly mentioned, but “open networks” is.  This 
allows for wireless to fall into the HIPAA guidelines.  Specifically, it states that data 
must be encrypted while on an open network, and ideally would include some mechanism 
to check the integrity of the transmitted data.3  The HIPAA statute requires health plans, 
health care providers, and other covered entities to maintain reasonable and appropriate 
safeguards to protect individually identifiable health information.  Under the HIPAA 
privacy rules, a covered entity must have in place appropriate administrative, technical, 
and physical safeguards to protect the privacy of electronic and non-electronic protected 
health information.  The HIPAA security rules were issued in final form on February 20, 
2003.  They apply to protected health information in electronic form only.  The core 
principles of the final rules require covered entities to: (1) ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health information the covered entity 
creates, receives, maintains, or transmits; (2) protect against any reasonably anticipated 
threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such information; (3) protect against any  
                                                 
3 AirMagnet. Wi-Fi, Health Care, and HIPAA: WLAN Management in the Modern Hospital. Pg.1. Last accessed 
July 2004. 
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reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of such information that are not permitted or 
required under [the security rules]; and (4) ensure compliance with the [security rules] by 
its workforce.4 
Institutions that fall under these guidelines have until April 21, 2005 to be 
compliant.  The exception to this rule is small health institutions.  They are granted one 
more year to allow for compliance. 
There are three major areas that HIPAA focuses on.  They are (1) 
Administrative Safeguards, (2) Physical Safeguards, and (3) Technical Safeguards.  The 
first one, Administrative Safeguards (found in Section 164.308) offers regulations for 
management of healthcare organizations.  The next, Physical Safeguards (found in 
Section 164.310), discusses how secure the facility should be.  The third is the area that 
pertains most to WLANs within an MTF.  Technical Safeguards (found in Section 
164.312) establishes regulations for access control to networks, integrity and security of 
data and transmissions, auditing, and last authentication.   
In order to provide the highest security to a wireless network, the relevant 
regulations need to be extracted from the HIPAA document and interpreted for use. The 
following is a brief summary of the standards that relate. 
 
1. Access control (164.312 (a) (1)) is simply what the name implies, 
controlling who is granted access to the organization’s resources. 
 
2. Auditing (164.312 (b)) is maintaining logs of who accessed a given 
resource at what time and where so that in the event of a security 
compromise there will be an audit trail. 
 
3. Integrity (164.312 (c) (1)) consists of making sure that PHI is not modified 
in any way by an un authorized user during transmission or storage. 
 
                                                 
4 Gainer, Randy, van Eckhardt, Michael, Will, Rebecca, Marks, Richard. HIPAA and WiFi – Regulatory Tangles 




4. Person authentication (164.312 (d)) is authenticating that the person the 
computer says they are really the correct person. This could be argued that 
it should be done at the server, but I think we can take it a step further and 
authorize the user when they transition from the wireless to the wired 
network. 
 
5. Transmission security (164.312 (e) (1)) is ensuring that the network 
transmissions are kept private and since the media is the air this is a high 
priority in wireless environments.5 
 
HIPPA has demonstrated what it requires from each medical facility to 
have prior to its deadline.  Table 1 gives a brief summary of what is required by each 
medical facility.  Table 1 also provides some solutions for the requirements.  These types 
of requirements will be discussed further within the security portion of this paper. 
 
 
HIPPA Requirements Available Solutions 
Privacy and Integrity throughout all patient 
data. 
• Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
• Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) 
• Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
Detection of intrusions and other 
unwarranted network activity must be 
found and alerted. 
An Intrusion Detection System that 
monitors, alerts, and tracks unauthorized 
activity along the network. 
Periodical checks of IDS must be 
performed to find new vulnerabilities. 
System tests along with results and findings 
should be performed on a regular basis. 
Policies and findings from tests must be 
documented to measure effectiveness of 
security system. 
A security plan that documents how PHI 
will be kept confidential, along with 
threats, countermeasures, and training will 
be created. 
Table 1.   HIPPA Requirements with Solution. 
                                                 
5 O’Dorisio, Daniel. Securing Wireless Networks for HIPAA Compliance. Version 1.4 Option 2 (Case Study). 




It is up to BUMED and its affiliates to create a policy for Navy Medicine to 
follow in order for WLANs to operate at MTFs.  Directives have been laid out for the use 
of commercial WLAN products within DoD.  Compliance with these directives along 
with HIPAA makes it possible to implement a WLAN within an MTF, but it may become 
difficult until the first MTFs have been installed with them and the bugs have been 
worked out.  It can be done, because hospitals in the private sector are currently operating 
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II. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
A. THE DRIVING FORCE OF CHANGE 
The driving force behind WLAN comes from the health care provider’s need for 
mobility while performing patient care on a day-to-day basis.  The mobility of the health 
care providers within the MTF provides an important part of the delivery system of 
patient care.  By allowing each to move from treatment room to treatment room without 
having to sit down at a static desktop display and input lab, x-ray, or other forms gives 
them greater flexibility with patients.  This also helps to increase the amount of patients 
to be seen, and with wireless mobility health care providers can be right beside the patient 
to review records or other facets of their job that may concern the patient. 
The need for greater bandwidth helps in providing a service to the health care 
provider by offering more applications that pertain to their area of work.  Radiologist can 
use the bandwidth to review x-rays and other imaging that used to be done stationary at a 
desk.  Now they will have the ability to move throughout the MTF and maintain 
consistent communication with their personnel and patients, while reviewing x-rays and 
other radiological applications.  
B. BUREAU OF MEDICINE (BUMED) 
BUMED is researching the concept of developing and deploying WLANs 
throughout its MTFs, but further research has to be done.  There are many different 
factors that have to be taken into account prior to deploying.  This appears to be decided 
at the executive level.  This is an acquisition concern as well.  BUMED’s driving force is 
pretty much the same as any other private sector MTF.  Like the hospitals within the 
private sector, Naval MTFs require much of the same levels of necessity.  The need for 
compliance with DoD Directives and other policies adds to the requirements and needs.   
The only difference between the two is the operational aspect of the military.  It 
would be thought that by being a DoD affiliate that there is a little leeway with the 
policies, but since the subject is about protected health information (PHI) there is very 
little leeway due to the other regulations that cover military medicine in general. 
 
10 
C. MTF STAFF 
From a health care provider’s perspective the need for wireless would allow them 
more mobility throughout their clinic or ward.  There are many applications that could be 
used with wireless that allows the doctor to perform the same functions on a wireless 
PDA or Tablet PC that are already performed from a desktop.  Some of these functions 
involve order labs, x-rays, retrieving past medical history.  This concept of moving from 
floor to floor would work well for all medical personnel who utilize network data for 
their day to day use.  Being stuck behind a desk to review or order patient related data 
can be time consuming.  This paperwork often overwhelms healthcare staff, taking 50-70 
percent of their time.6 
D. SUMMARY 
Mobility, along with optimization of time and accuracy, create the driving forces 
that many MTFs need within a cost restrictive environment that is currently in place.  The 
ability to stay mobile provides a great advantage for the health care provider who is 
dedicated to patient care.  Therefore, the MTF receives more”bang for the buck” with 














                                                 
6 Geier, Jim. Applications of Wireless Networks. [http://www.wireless-  
nets.com/papers/wireless_network_applications.htm]. Last accessed July 2004. 
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III. OPERATIONAL FAMILIARIZATION 
A. THE IEEE 802.11 WIRELESS FREQUENCY 
1. Introduction 
802.11 is an off-spring of some of the earliest wireless technology that dates back 
to the early 1900s.  Actually, it is also a work group that is dedicated to the development 
of 802.11 frequencies with the goal of providing secure mobile communication.  Within 
802.11 there are several different groups working to develop different variations of the 
802.11 model.  They range from 802.11 itself, to a, b, and g.  There are others, but these 
will be the ones we will focus on.  
802.11 was the first to be developed.  It specifically covers the operation of the 
media access control (MAC) and physical layers.  802.11 also cover three physical layers.  
The one that is focused on in this paper is the Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS).  
DSSS functions by dividing the data onto several pieces and simultaneously sending the 
pieces on as many different frequencies as possible, unlike FHSS, which sends on a 
limited number of frequencies.  This process allows for greater transmission rates than 
FHSS, but is vulnerable to greater occurrences of interference.   This is because the data 
is spanning a larger portion of the spectrum at any given time than FHSS.  In essence, 
DSSS floods the spectrum all at one time, whereas FHSS selectively transmits over 
certain frequencies.7 
The 802.11 standard provides MAC and PHY (Physical Layer) functionality for 
wireless connectivity of fixed, portable, and moving stations moving at pedestrian and 
vehicular speeds within a local area.  Specific features of the 802.11 standard include the 
following: 
• Support of asynchronous and time-bounded delivery service. 
• Continuity of service within extended areas via a distribution system, such 
as Ethernet. 
                                                 
7 Wheat, J. and others. Designing a Wireless Network. Pg. 125-126. Syngress, 2002.  
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• Accommodation of transmission rates of 1Mbps and 2Mbps (802.11a and 
802.11b extensions offer higher data rates than the base standard). 
• Support of most market applications. 
• Multicast (including broadcast services. 
• Network management services. 
• Registration and authentication services.8 
802.11a provides a throughput of 54 Mbps (24 Mbps average) with a range of 
approximately 50 – 100 feet.  It was created due to the overwhelming demand for more 
bandwidth and the growing number of technologies operating within the 2.4 GHz band.  
802.11a was created for WLAN use in North America as an alternative to 802.11b, which 
operates at the 2.4 GHz band.  It is not backward compatible with 802.11.  802.11a 
operates at the 5 GHz band.  This reduces the chance of interference.  802.11a is 
expensive.  It is estimated that future versions will exceed 100Mbps. 
802.11b is the most common amongst Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
wireless products.  It operates on the 2.4 GHz band, which is considered the Industrial, 
Scientific, and Medical band.  This band is unlicensed; therefore the chance for 
interference is increased.  Its throughput is 11Mbps (5 Mbps average).  The average is 
based on its half-duplex configuration.  Its range is around 200-300 feet. 
802.11b uses WEP for security.  It is protection, but there have been many 
successful attempts at cracking WEP.  It is not a very good means of deterring script 
kiddies, or the more harden hacker from gaining access into your wireless network.  A 
WEP key can be deciphered in a matter of hours depending on the hardware and software 
used for the attack. 
802.11g is an easy choice for corporate sites and home users to adopt because it 
doesn't require an upgrade to client equipment.  802.11g is backward-compatible with 
802.11b, and it offers speeds similar to those of 802.11a.9  It operates on the 2.4 GHz 
                                                 
8 Geier, Jim. Wireless LANs: Implementing High Performance IEEE 802.11 Networks. Second Edition. Pg.77-78. 
SAMS Publishing. 2002 
9 IBM. The 802.11g Standard –IEEE. [http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/wireless/library/wi-ieee.html]. 
March 2003. 
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band, and carries a throughput of 54 Mbps.  Its range is 1000 feet under ideal conditions, 
but on average it is more like 150 – 300 feet.   
802.11g uses the same security measure, WEP, to help secure the network.  It also 
uses OFDM, AES, and possibly WPA/Wi-Fi to protect access.  OFDM is orthogonal 
frequency division multiplexing.  It is an FDM modulation technique for transmitting 
large amounts of digital data over a radio wave.  OFDM works by splitting the radio 
signal into multiple smaller sub-signals that are then transmitted simultaneously at 
different frequencies to the receiver.  AES is short for Advanced Encryption Standard, a 
symmetric 128-bit block data encryption technique developed by Belgian cryptographers 
Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen.  The U.S government adopted the algorithm as its 
encryption technique in October 2000, replacing the DES encryption it used. AES works 
at multiple network layers simultaneously.  The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) of the U.S. Department of Commerce selected the algorithm, called 
Rijndael (pronounced Rhine Dahl or Rain Doll), out of a group of five algorithms under 
consideration, including one called MARS from a large research team at IBM.10  Last, 
WPA/Wi-Fi is defined as a security technology for wireless networks.  WPA improves on 
the authentication and encryption features of WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy).  In fact, 
WPA was developed by the networking industry in response to the shortcomings of 
WEP.11 
2. Strengths 
There are many advantages to using a WLAN with 802.11x technologies.  One of 
these is commonality.  802.11x technologies are more Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
products.  Other types of wireless technology may be either proprietary, non-
interoperable, or comes with an expensive price tag.  It may be a combination of them all 
or just a couple.   
Another strength or advantage is the ability to place a wireless access point where 
a wired connection is unable to be.  Many of the MTFs within the Navy are growing in 
                                                 
10 Wi-Fi Planet. AES. [ http://wi-fiplanet.webopedia.com/TERM/A/AES.html]. October 2003. 
11 Mitchell, Bradley. “WPA – Wi-Fi Protected Access”. 
[http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/wirelesssecurity/g/bldef_wpa.htm]. Last accessed July 2004. 
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age.  This limits the ability to add different “LAN drops” throughout the buildings, thus 
creating a larger budget for materials and labor cost.   
Cost is a driving force that causes any decision making entity to determine what 
type of network will be implemented.  By using wireless, the cost of a network can be 
reduced considerably.  Companies reorganize, resulting in the movement of people, new 
floor plans, office partitions, and other renovations.  These changes often require 
recabling the network, incurring both labor and material costs.  In some cases, the 
recabling costs of organizational changes are substantial, especially with large enterprise 
networks.  A reorganization rate of 15% each year can result in yearly reconfiguration 
expenses as high as $250,000 for networks that have 6,000 interconnected devices.  The 
advantage of wireless networking is again based on the lack of cable: You can move the 
network connection by simply relocating an employee’s PC.12 
3. Weaknesses 
Security is always the biggest concern for wireless.  The introduction of Wireless 
Equivalent Privacy was created to help deter anyone from gaining access into a WLAN.  
The downfall to this is that it is accessible to a Brute Force attack.  Access to the network 
can be performed by utilizing different types of software that are able to infiltrate the 
wireless network either by poisoning the Address Resolution Protocol, which creates a 
Man-in-the-middle scenario, or as mentioned in the previous sentence, Brute Force.  
These attacks will be discussed further in the paper. 
Another weakness is interoperability.  As vendors look to maintain an edge on 
competition, there is a need to ensure that their product can operate with other products.  
When different types of hardware are created to provide service to a specific frequency 
band there is the possibility of it having non-backwards compatibility.  Interoperability of 
products using the same frequency band not only hurts the company creating the product, 
but it also hurts the consumer and eventually causes the product to become unused. 
 
                                                 
12 Geier, Jim. Wireless LANs: Implementing High Performance IEEE 802.11 Networks. Second Edition. Pg.13. 
SAMS Publishing. 2002 
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4. Application to Naval Medical Treatment Facilities 
The concept of developing and deploying an 802.11x WLAN within a Naval 
MTF is possible.  The concerns about wireless within an MTF involve compliance with 
the policies that govern.  Not only do policies play a role, but so does interference with 
other devices using the same signal.  802.11, 802.11b and 802.11g operate on the 2.4 
GHz band.  This band is called the ISM band (Industrial, Scientific, and Medical).  These 
frequencies reside between 902 MHz and 5.85 GHz, just above the cellular phone 
operating frequencies.  The ISM band is very attractive to wireless network vendors 
because it provides a part of the spectrum upon which to base their products, and end 
users do not have to obtain FCC licenses to operate the products.13   
Throughout many of the wards in an MTF there are devices that broadcast bio-
information that is crucial to the survival of patients.  The possibility of interfering with 
either the WLAN or the other devices becomes a concern.  To counter this, the idea of 
shielding the medical equipment from WLAN interference has become the solution.  This 
will be discussed further later in the paper.     
B. HARDWARE DEVICES 
1. Introduction 
The hardware devices discussed within this paper are the devices that are most 
commonly used throughout all WLANs.  These devices are what make a WLAN 
possible.  The hardware devices used for a WLAN piggy back off of an already wired 
LAN.  By piggy backing off of a wired LAN redundancy can occur to ensure that 
communication and patient care can be performed. 
2. Switches 
A switch is a small device that joins multiple computers together at a low-level 
network protocol layer.  Technically, network switches operate at layer two (Data Link 
Layer) of the OSI model.  Network switches look nearly identical to hubs, but a switch 
generally contains more "intelligence" (and a slightly higher price tag) than a hub.  
Unlike hubs, network switches are capable of inspecting the data packets as they are 
                                                 
13 Geier, Jim. Wireless LANs: Implementing High Performance IEEE 802.11 Networks. Second Edition. Pg.31. 
SAMS Publishing. 2002 
16 
received, determining the source and destination device of that packet, and forwarding 
that packet appropriately.  By delivering messages only to the connected device that it 
was intended for, network switches conserve network bandwidth and offer generally 
better performance than hubs.  
As with hubs, Ethernet network switches are the most common.  A network 
switch offers differing port configurations starting with the four- and five-port models, 
and support 10 Mbps Ethernet, 100 Mbps Ethernet, or both.14  This is where the WLAN 




Figure 3.1. 3com Superstack 3 Switch 3824 (3c17400) (From Ref. 46). 
 
 
3. Network Interface Controller (NIC) 
Often abbreviated as NIC, it is an expansion board you insert into a computer so 
the computer can be connected to a network.  Most NICs are designed for a particular 
type of network, protocol, and media, although some can serve multiple networks.15  The 
NIC is the primary hardware component that allows the end-user access to the wired 
network via the wireless AP.  It comes in different variations.  One type of NIC can be 
installed into the laptop computer by way of a PCMCIA slot on the mother board.  The 
next type is already attached to the motherboard internally.  There are other types of NIC 
cards, but since this paper is discussing healthcare provider mobility it is best to discuss 
just these two.  Figure 3.2 shows some examples of NICs that can be purchased as COTS. 
                                                 
14 Mitchell, Bradley. Switches. [http://comnetworking.about.com/library/glossary/bldef-switch.htm]. Last 
accessed July 2004. 
15 Network Interfaces Cards. http://ww.webopedia.com/TERM/n/network_interface_card_NIC.html].  Last 
accessed July 2004. 
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Figure 3.2. D-link DWL-650; Dell Trumobile; Linksys Wireless G (From 
Refs. 47, 48, & 49). 
 
4. Access Points 
Access Points are hardware devices or a computer's software application that acts 
as a communication hub for users of a wireless device to connect to a wired LAN.  APs 
are important for providing heightened wireless security and for extending the physical 
range of service a wireless user has access to.  APs, through software protocol, can 
prevent unauthorized end-users access to the AP by using the Wired Equivalency Privacy 
(WEP) protocol, or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA).  APs provide access via an 
authorization network protocol, which allows an end-user the ability to communicate 
with the wired LAN.  The software application of the AP can provide MAC filtering that 
allows only specified MAC addresses authorization to the network.  Figure 3.3 shows 
examples of what an Access Point may look like.   
 
Figure 3.3. Intel Pro Wireless 2011B LAN Enterprise AP Hub; Cisco 
Aironet 1200 Enterprise AP; HP ProCurve Wireless Enterprise AP (From Refs. 56, 
57, & 58). 
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5. Shielding 
A concern for utilizing wireless within an MTF is the interference that may be 
encountered with other medical equipment.  There are different types of wards in an 
MTF.  Each one brings to the table a different situation that may result in the failure of 
their equipment if an access point were to be installed within close proximity.  Studies 
have shown that using the 802.11 frequency around medical equipment poses little threat 
to the medical equipment within range of its signal.  There is very little evidence that 
EMI is the cause of fatal accidents within an MTF.  This allows APs to be placed in key 
areas of the MTF and provide wireless access for the health care providers to gain access 
to the patient information needed. 
Currently, the only ban being put into place for EMI management within DoD 
MTFs is in regard to cell phone use.  Most hospitals have bans on the use of cellular 
phones inside their facilities, despite the absence of any comprehensive scientific 
information supporting the impression that cell phones are dangerous in hospitals.  For 
years, the FDA and FCC have known that EM radiation from various sources could 
interfere with delicate medical equipment.  The ban on cell phones in hospitals has grown 
to become one of the “urban myths” of our society.  But, there is no such ban. 16 
A report in 1997 from the National Health Service in England, DB9702, stated 
that only 4% of handheld transmitters (all types) cause any interference at a distance of 
one meter (~3 feet).  Also, the study stated that, “The type of radio handset made a large 
difference to the likelihood of interference.”  At a distance of 1 meter, 41% of medical 
devices suffered interference from emergency services handsets, 35% suffered 
interference from security/porters handsets but only 4% from cell phones.  No significant 
levels of interference were detected from cordless handsets/local area networks or 
cellular base stations.17 
 
 
                                                 
16 Gilfor, Jeff Dr. Wireless devices and Electromagnetic Interference in Hospitals, Urban Myth? 
[http://www.pdamd.com/features/interference.xml]. Pg. 1. July 2004. 
17 MDA. MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS: INTERFERENCE WITH MEDICAL DEVICES. 
[http://www.medical-
devices.gov.uk/mda/mdawebsitev2.nsf/0/483b6bb5b6fbc80780256c8b003c88f3/$FILE/sn9706.pdf]. April  1997. 
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C. NETWORK TOPOLOGIES 
1. Multi-Point (Star) 
The opportunity to use a Multi-Point (Star) topology may occur when there is a 
need to broadcast the wired LAN into areas where there may not be an IT infrastructure 
available.  A star topology allows areas within the MTF architecture the opportunity to 
receive network access from a central point of access.  An example of this would be a 
large hospital that has multiple satellite buildings set up around the main building.  
Instead of spending a large sum of money to install wires to connect each building a 
wireless network can be set up to allow network access by using antennas atop each 
building.  This allows each building to receive the network transmission.  Once each 
building has received connectivity through the antenna, then it can be sent throughout the 
building via CAT 5 cable to each of the APs within and broadcast.  Another example is 
just having an AP fixed within the center of a room or office.  This AP would broadcast a 
360 degree directional signal to everyone within the vicinity and they may be able to 
communicate through the AP to one another.  Figure 3.4 shows how the multi-point (star) 















Figure 3.5. Wireless Multi-Point (Star) Topology from AP Inside Building. 
 
2. Point-to-Point 
Point-to-Point topology may be used in certain situations where only a key area 
needs to be transmitted to.  If the need arises to create a WLAN that requires the signal to 
focus its path towards one floor a point-to-point topology may be the trick.  The idea 
would be to adjust the antenna’s broadcasting cone toward one end of the building 
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towards the other.  Now, with that said, the antenna used my cause some sort of bleed 
over within its immediate position.  Examples of this would be the yagi, patch, or panel 
antennas.  They provide a semi-directional cone, but also bleed off to the sides.  Figure 
3.6 is a diagram of how yagi and patch panels broadcast.  Figure 3.7 is an example of 
what a point-to-point semi-directional topology would look like outdoors.  Figure 3.9 
demonstrates the use of a semi-directional antenna indoors.   
 
Figure 3.6. Signal Direction for Patch and Yagi Antenna.18 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Point-To-Point Topology Showing Semi-Direction 
Broadcasting Outdoors. 
                                                 




Figure 3.8. Semi-Directional Broadcast Indoors. 
 
D. SECURITY 
1. Threat Assessment 
During a site survey a need to establish what the threats are is very important.  
There are different types of security threats that plague wireless.  Since the medium used 
by wireless is broadcasted over the airwaves the ability to pull packets right out of the air 
is simple.  The task for a security manager is to prevent the information floating over 
these airwaves from being deciphered by unauthorized patrons.  There are different types 
of attacks that a WLAN may encounter.  Also, there are different types of attackers.  
Disgruntled employees that are currently working or were previously employed by the 
company can perform malicious acts to get back at their employers.  Another attacker is 
the one from the outside.   This person could be using the social engineering concept by 
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talking to employees to gather information, or by just browsing the web-sites for 
discrepancies.  They can also just sit outside the target of choice and perform their attack.  
Outsiders can use both the passive or active attack upon an unsuspecting target. 
A passive attack means that the person performing the attack has no intentions of 
maliciously compromising the network in which it is monitoring.  The attack is more like 
an information gathering exercise.  There are different types of software applications that 
can perform these types of passive attacks.   
Passive attacks involve packet capturing.  With the right software any person can 
detect what type of signal is being broadcast.  They can tell the SSID, whether or not it is 
using WEP, and its frequency.  Other types can gather the packets that are being 
transmitted through the air.  It may take millions of packets to decipher what the 
encryption key is for WEP, but it can be done in just a matter of hours or a few days.  If 
the key is greatly encrypted, then it could take a much longer time.  
An active attack is designed for the sole purpose of manipulating a network or 
system depending on the need.  An active attack attempts to perform by connecting to the 
system by backdoor capabilities.  Once the system is compromised the ability to probe 
the network becomes quite easy.  Network configurations can be performed to allow the 
hacker authorization by becoming an end-user through an account that is created. 
One active attack is the Denial of Service (DoS).  This can also be called 
jamming.  Since it is a radio frequency the opportunity to jam the signal is there.  It does 
not take much to perform this task.  An attacker can jam all the radio communications of 
a WLAN with high powered transceiver.  It is almost impossible to protect yourself 
against such an attack, except perhaps, with some very sophisticated/hard-to-use 
equipment, like faraday's cage.19 
An interesting attack is the man-in-the-middle attack.  This task is performed by 
creating an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning.  This attack allows the hacker 
the ability to “spoof” the AP Media Access Control (MAC) address, which causes the 
other MAC addresses associated with the AP to transmit data through the hacker’s MAC 
                                                 
19 Räty, J. and Kaukinen, S. Defeating security in wireless LANs. Pg. 3. Last accessed July 2004. 
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address.  It is another form of information gathering, but in can be used for malicious 
activity along the network as well.  This could be considered a DoS if the man-in-the-
middle decides to manipulate both end-users into thinking that the information received is 
authentic from the person assumed to be the sender.  Therefore, the original information 
that is expected to be received by the right MAC address is compromised by the hacker 
and the original information is stopped dead in its tracks and configured however the 
hacker desires. 
2. Tools to Prevent 
There are different tools that are available to help deter or prevent an attack from 
occurring, and many more are being created just as fast as new technology arises.  The 
ones discussed within this paper are the more common applications that help in deterring 
the common “script kiddy” hacker and possibly the professional “black hat” hacker as 
well. 
a.  Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) 
WEP is an algorithm designed to help encrypt the data that is transmitted 
over a wireless network.  Granted, it is not the cure all for wireless, but it is better than 
broadcasting important information over the air unprotected.  WEP encrypts only the data 
being transmitted.  The disadvantage of that is the header is left in plain site for those 
who may be gathering packets.  As mentioned before the use of WEP has its limitations.  
WEP's security flaws have been widely known ever since January of 2001, when the 
University of California at Berkeley issued a highly publicized paper.  Since then, WEP 
has been roundly criticized for flaws that include weak encryption, characterized by keys 
that are no longer than 40 bits; static encryption keys; and lack of a key distribution 
method.20  The ability to crack WEP is becoming much easier.  The need for a stronger 
encryption tool is underway, along with the creation of various IEEE wireless groups 
focusing on this issue as well. 
WEP is an RC4 64-bit stream cipher that the 802.11 committee intended 
to be used for both authentication and encryption.  RC4 is a weak encryption and the 
                                                 
20 Emigh, J. WPA: Is Wi-Fi’s Security Bandage Going to Win Over Network Admins? [http://www.wi-    
fiplanet.com/tutorials/article.php/1550561]. December 2002. 
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designers knew this at the time of selection.  Existing US encryption export laws 
restricted more advanced encrypted data algorithms.  The 802.11 group felt that capturing 
foreign markets was more important then security.  It was later discovered that there were 
even more significant flaws in the WEP design.  
The most fundamental problem is when WEP is used for authentication.  
The process begins where the access point generates a random sequence of characters and 
sends them to a client requesting access to the wireless network.  In order for the client to 
gain access to the network it must encrypt the string and send it as a response.  The AP 
then decrypts the string, and if it matches its original transmission, the client is granted 
access.  The problem with this method is that it allows a would-be hacker the possibility 
of intercepting both unencrypted challenge and the encrypted response.   
A hacker can then easily derive the WEP key from these two values.  
Secondly, a hacker might also begin a brute force or dictionary attack to derive the WEP 
key.  A brute force attack is to try every combination of keys and a dictionary attack is to 
try variations of common words.  The effectiveness of this attack is that the AP will 
respond immediately if the WEP key for authentication is correct or not.  It is highly 
recommended that WEP not be used as the only means of authentication.  By themselves 
WEP keys can be hacked in as little as 15 minutes if used for authentication.  Bill 
Arbaugh’s paper Your 802.11 Wireless Network has no Clothes 21 explains this 
vulnerability in greater detail.  WEP keys are also used for data encryption.  
Unfortunately the WEP key can be reversed engineered by hackers if approximately 5-10 
million packets can be intercepted even if WEP is used solely for encryption and not for 
authentication. On a heavily loaded network this might take several hours.  On a lightly 
loaded network this traffic analysis might take up to a week.  The vulnerability is based 
on statistical analysis due to the repetition of the initialization vectors. Fluhrer, Mantin, 
and Shamir’s paper Weakness in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC422 and Adam 
                                                 
21 Arbaugh W. Your 802.11 Wireless Network Has No Clothes. 
[http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/wireless.pdf]. March 2001. 
 
22 Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir. Weakness in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4 
[http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/rc4_ksaproc.pdf]. August 2001. 
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Stubblefield’s Using Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir Attack to break WEP23  explains this 
vulnerability in greater depth.  Freeware Linux programs AirSnort and WEP Crack can 
be downloaded at http://airsnort.shmoo.com/ and http://sourceforge.net/projects/wepcrack 
to crack WEP using a Linux operating system.  Lucent, Cisco and several other vendors 
have upgraded their firmware to prevent the exploitation of this vulnerability when using 
their cards. Nevertheless, if a hacker can mount an active attack using a non- upgraded 
firmware card, the WEP vulnerability still exists.  Of course the 5-10 million packets of 
interception can then only work between an access point and a client with a non-upgraded 
firmware card.  This may force a hacker to actively interact with a target network using a 
non-upgraded card.  This would pose greater risk for the hacker because going active 
might reveal the hacker’s position.  So it is a good idea to upgrade your firmware so it 
will take longer for a hacker to crack the WEP key and increase the hacker’s visibility.  
The length of the encryption in the 802.11 spec is 64 bits which includes a 
24-bit initialization vector and a 40-bit encryption key.  Most vendors have allowed for 
longer keys such 128-bit and 152-bit keys.  They are also referred to 40, 104, and 128 bit 
keys because of the 24 bit IV is not counted.  This has caused confusion, but they are in 
fact the same.  Also according to Jessie Walker’s paper Unsafe at any key size; an 
analysis of the WEP encapsulation24, increasing the WEP key does nothing to increase 
WEP’s resistance to attack because of how WEP uses cryptography, not the key size.  
Because the 128 and 152 WEP keys sizes are not specified in the 802.11 specification use 
of multiple vendors can cause interoperability problems.  The long-term solution as 
expressed by the 802.11i group is to replace WEP with Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES).  In the mean time if no other encryption mechanisms are available, it is 
recommended to use WEP and upgrade the firmware on all access points and all user 
clients.25 
                                                 
23 Stubblefield, A. Using Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir Attack to Break WEP. 
[http://www.cs.rice.edu/~astubble/wep]. August 2001. 
24 Walker, J. Unsafe at Any Key Size; An Analysis of the WEP Encapsulation, 
[http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/0-362.zip]. October 2000. 
25 Roth, Joseph L., Enterprise Implementations of Wireless Network Technologies At The Naval Postgraduate 
School and Other Military Educational Institutions. Master’s Thesis.  Naval Postgraduate School.  Pg. 44-46. 
Monterey, California.  September 2002. 
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b. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) 
Wi-Fi Protected Access is a Wi-Fi standard that was designed to improve 
upon the security features of WEP.  The technology is designed to work with existing 
Wi-Fi products that have been enabled with WEP (i.e., as a software upgrade to existing 
hardware), but the technology includes two improvements over WEP:  
• Improved data encryption through the temporal key integrity protocol 
(TKIP).  TKIP scrambles the keys using a hashing algorithm and, by 
adding an integrity-checking feature, ensures that the keys haven’t been 
tampered with.  
• User authentication, which is generally missing in WEP, through the 
extensible authentication protocol (EAP).  WEP regulates access to a 
wireless network based on a computer’s hardware-specific MAC address, 
which is relatively simple to be sniffed out and stolen. EAP is built on a 
more secure public-key encryption system to ensure that only authorized 
network users can access the network.  
It should be noted that WPA is an interim standard that will be replaced with the IEEE’s 
802.11i standard upon its completion.26 
c. Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
Virtual Private Networks are formats that create “tunnels” within an 
existing public LAN or WLAN.  These tunnels allow information to be transferred over 
the LAN or WLAN encrypted.  They can be defined as encrypted tunnels with access 
control and host or user authentication.  VPNs provide a more active form of security by 
either encrypting or encapsulating data for transmission through an unsecured network.  
These two types of security—encryption and encapsulation—form the foundation of 
virtual private networking.  However, both encryption and encapsulation are generic 
terms that describe a function that can be performed by a myriad of specific technologies.  
                                                 
26 Internet.com. Webopedia. WPA. [http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/W/WPA.html]. Last accessed July 2004. 
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To add to the confusion, these two sets of technologies can be combined in different 
implementation topologies.  Thus, VPNs can vary widely from vendor to vendor.27 
They use encryption in the lower protocol layers to provide a secure 
connection through an otherwise insecure network, typically the Internet.  VPNs are 
generally cheaper than real private networks using private lines, but rely on having the 
same encryption system at both ends.  The encryption may be performed by firewall 
software or possibly by routers.  Link-level (layer 2 and 3) encryption provides extra 
protection by encrypting all of each datagram except the link-level information.  This 
prevents a listener from obtaining information about network structure.  While link-level 
encryption prevents traffic analysis (a form of attack), it must encrypt/decrypt on every 
hop and every path.  Protocol-level encryption (layer 3 and 4) encryption encrypts 
protocol data but leaves protocol and link headers clear.  While protocol-level encryption 
requires you to encrypt/decrypt data only once, and it encrypts/decrypts only those 
sessions that need it, headers are sent as clear text, allowing traffic analysis.  Application 
(layer 5 up) encryption is based on a particular application and requires that the 
application be modified to incorporate encryption.28 
An example of how a wireless VPN works can be seen in Figure 3.9.  
First, the user's computer connects to an access point in the uiuc-wireless-net network 
and is assigned an IP address in that range (172.21.0.0 /20).  Machines on this subnet are 
not allowed to access anything outside that network without authenticating through the 
VPN server.  
Next, when the user runs the VPN client, the computer makes a VPN 
connection request which is routed to the VPN server.  The router sends VPN connection 
requests from the uiuc-wireless-net to the VPN server, but drops any requests for other 
campus locations or the Internet from uiuc-wireless-net. 
                                                 
27 Virtual Private Networks. [http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ito_doc/vpn.htm#xtocid2]. Last 
accessed July 2004. 
28 Dictionary.com. VPN. [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=virtual+private+network&r=67]. Last 
accessed July 2004. 
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The VPN server takes the user's authentication request and communicates 
with the Radius server and the Kerberos server to determine whether the user is 
authenticating correctly.  If so, the VPN server establishes an encrypted tunnel with the 
wireless computer over the blue path (using the computer's real ID).  The VPN server 
takes the encrypted communications the client computer sends to it, de-encrypts the 
information, and forwards the information along to its destination with its identity 
represented as a part of the VPN-assigned network address range. 
Requests from computers in the uiuc-vpn-net address range are allowed 
access to both campus resources and the Internet.  Requests that would not be permitted if 
the router received them unencrypted from uiuc-wireless-net are permitted after the VPN 
server has begun representing the computer's identity as part of the uiuc-vpn-net address 
range.  The VPN server is the only machine that knows the blue computer's true identity 
and location; it exchanges information over the encrypted tunnel it established with that 
machine, and redirects the data as though it originated in an unencrypted form from a 
machine with a uiuc-vpn-net IP address.29 
 
Figure 3.9. Virtual Private Network (From Ref. 29). 
 
                                                 
29 Cites. VPN networking diagram. [http://www.cites.uiuc.edu/vpn/vpnnetdiagram.html]. Last accessed July 
2004. 
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d. Secure Shell (SSH) 
Secure shell was developed by SSH Communications Security Ltd.  
Secure Shell is a program to log into another computer over a network, to execute 
commands in a remote machine, and to move files from one machine to another.  It 
provides strong authentication and secure communications over insecure channels.  It is a 
replacement for rlogin, rsh, rcp, and rdist.  SSH protects a network from attacks such as 
IP spoofing, IP source routing, and DNS spoofing.  An attacker who has managed to take 
over a network can only force SSH to disconnect.  He or she cannot play back the traffic 
or hijack the connection when encryption is enabled.  When using SSH's slogin (instead 
of rlogin) the entire login session, including transmission of password, is encrypted; 
therefore it is almost impossible for an outsider to collect passwords.30  It was originally 
designed to replace popular telnet, ftp and UC Berkley UNIX ‘r’ commands with secured 
encrypted versions.  Secure Shell standard has been expanded to perform these crucial 
tasks securely: 
• secure remote access into a computer system 
• securely transfer and copy files between systems 
• act as a software VPN or tunnel to secure protocols like SMTP, POP, FTP, 
Telnet, X-windows which are not inherently secure on the TCP/IP wire31 
This is important to patient care, since the patient’s information would be broadcasted via 
radio frequency (RF).  
e. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is a protocol that provides an encrypted data 
stream that is bi-directional.  This means that the data is encrypted at the sender’s end, 
and then decrypted at the receiver’s end.  Thus, it allows for both the server and client a 
two-way verification that is not able to be compromised and alter during the transmission.   
                                                 
30 Internet.com. Webopedia. Secure Shell (SSH). [http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/SSH.html]. Last accessed 
July 2004. 
31 Pragma Systems Inc. Secure Shell (sshd) Server for Windows NT/2000/XP. Pg. 1. August 2001. 
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SSL is created to work in between the application and network layer 
(Please refer to the OSI model in Appendix A.).  TCP/IP employs no security measures to 
prevent data sniffing, hijacking or insertion and is unsuitable on its own for connections 
containing sensitive information.  SSL sits in-between high level protocols (such as 
HTTP or IMAP) and the low-level protocols of TCP over IP providing the needed 
security for such transactions to take place.  It uses TCP/IP on behalf of the higher level 
protocols and once the correct client/server software is installed can appear transparent. 32  
See Figure 3.10 for diagram. 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Diagram of SSL Operation. (From Ref 50 
 http://harmony.haxors.com). 
 
f. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
Intrusion Detection Systems are applications that monitor traffic that 
enters and leaves a network.  They have the capabilities of detecting unauthorized access 
into the system, as well as determine where they have been throughout the network.  
There are several ways to categorize an IDS:  
• Misuse detection vs. anomaly detection: in misuse detection, the IDS 
analyzes the information it gathers and compares it to large databases of 
attack signatures.  Essentially, the IDS looks for a specific attack that has 
already been documented.  Like a virus detection system, misuse detection 
                                                 
32 Fewer, S. SSL. A discussion of the secure socket layer. [http://harmony.hazors.com] Last accessed July 2004. 
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software is only as good as the database of attack signatures that it uses to 
compare packets against.  In anomaly detection, the system administrator 
defines the baseline, or normal, state of the network’s traffic load, 
breakdown, protocol, and typical packet size.  The anomaly detector 
monitors network segments to compare their state to the normal baseline 
and look for anomalies.  
• Network-based vs. host-based systems: in a network-based system, or 
NIDS, the individual packets flowing through a network are analyzed.  
The NIDS can detect malicious packets that are designed to be overlooked 
by a firewall’s simplistic filtering rules.  In a host-based system, the IDS 
examines at the activity on each individual computer or host.  
• Passive system vs. reactive system: in a passive system, the IDS detects a 
potential security breach, logs the information and signals an alert.  In a 
reactive system, the IDS responds to the suspicious activity by logging off 
a user or by reprogramming the firewall to block network traffic from the 
suspected malicious source. 
Though they both relate to network security, an IDS differs from a firewall 
in that a firewall looks out for intrusions in order to stop them from happening.  The 
firewall limits the access between networks in order to prevent intrusion and does not 
signal an attack from inside the network.  An IDS evaluates a suspected intrusion once it 
has taken place and signals an alarm.  An IDS also watches for attacks that originate from 
within a system.  Figure 3.11 is an example of an IDS.33 
 
                                                 
33 Internet.com. Webopedia. Intrusion Detection Systems. 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/intrusion_detection_system.html. Last accessed July 2004. 
34 
 
Figure 3.11. IDS Diagram (From Ref. 51). 
 
g. Firewalls 
Firewalls are the most common defense for either a LAN or a WLAN.  
When configured properly they prevent personnel from accessing unauthorized URLs 
along with the prevention of hackers from entering into the LAN or WLAN.  A firewall 
acts as an interface between the Internet and a private network.  It can also be used in an 
Intranet capacity as well.  It regulates traffic between the networks for protecting the 
internal network from attacks originating from outside the network.  A firewall can 
isolate internal and external traffic by performing a bridge type service.  It can make 
addresses that are internal invisible and not accessible to the outside. The firewall can 
oversee the facilitation of encrypted connections to external parties over public networks 
by using a VPN.  Firewalls can filter outgoing traffic. They can also filter incoming 
traffic for malicious data, (e.g. viruses and inappropriate data (pornography), or by 
external users performing inappropriate actions, such as port scanning.  A firewall can 
block out specific addresses to provide better security and prevent users from viewing 
unsightly material.  Figure 3.12 shows how a firewall can be configured within a 
network.  As seen, there can be multiple firewalls throughout the system.  This gives the 




Figure 3.12. Firewall Diagram 
 
E. OTHER RELATED MATERIALS 
1. ReefEdge 
ReefEdge is a proprietary program that was created to prevent outside activity 
from entering into a wireless network.  It provides an optimized RF environment by 
monitoring and dynamically adapting APs located in a remote area (e.g. office, building, 
and a warehouse).  ReefEdge has three types of managing tools.  The one that can be 
applicable to this paper is the ReefEdge “Site Manager”.    It provides comprehensive 
single site capabilities for centralized authentication, policy, and mobility management.  
Its provides the following: 
 
• Seamless Mobility  
 The Site Manager links all ReefSwitches into a single mobility domain, 
allowing users to seamlessly roam through the WLAN preserving 
application connectivity and data security, and eliminating the need to re-
authenticate. User sessions are maintained across multiple subnets or 
36 
VLANs even when roaming out of wireless LAN coverage, enabling 
seamless session persistence for mission-critical applications, including 
VOIP. 
 
• Multi-Layer Security  
 A multi-layer security model is implemented and includes authentication, 
real-time policy management, encryption, and monitoring. Site Manager 
supports multiple methods of authentication, including device 
identification, 802.1x, browser-based access, and certificate-based login. 
Powerful policy management provides fine-grained control over a host of 
user and device parameters. Site Manager supports military-grade, FIPS-2 
certified, IPSec encryption as well as the new WPA and forthcoming 
802.11i standards. 
 
• Rapid Wireless Deployment  
 Rapid deployment is enabled through Zero-Config technology. Site 
Manager automatically discovers new ReefEdge WLAN EcoSystem 
components and deploys them quickly, and effectively. Centralized 
firmware and configuration management ensures easy maintenance and 
lower operations cost of the WLAN. Site Manager also supports staging, 
testing, and automated rollout of software updates. 
 
• IT Integration 
 Site Manager integrates the WLAN EcoSystem with existing IT systems, 
including authentication and policy management servers, accounting and 
logging servers, and network management systems. Wizards are provided 
for connecting to RADIUS, LDAP, Microsoft Active Directory, Novell 
Directory Services, Microsoft Windows domains, Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) systems. 
 
37 
• Site Manager support  
 SNMP v1/v2c/v3 with vendor MIBs and traps, as well as custom plugins 
for HP Openview and CA Unicenter.  
 
• Easy Provisioning of New Applications and Services  
 As the WLAN is used for new applications and services; Site Manager 
takes the guesswork out of deploying these new capabilities. Virtual 
firewalls are defined around different applications and user types—with 
each virtual firewall holding a particular access policy, encryption level, 
and bandwidth allocation.  
 
• Site Manager can be deployed in conjunction with the ReefEdge Air 
Manager or Multi-Site Manager, components of WiSe OS™. The 
integrated system GUI provides an overall view of wireless LAN 
performance and security across clients, access points, and ReefSwitches 
throughout the enterprise.34 
 
2. AirDefense 
AirDefense is designed to discover all wireless LAN devices within a network.  It 
provides a network map and inventory, and alerts when devices are unplugged or fail.  
AirDefense can automatically discover WLAN devices within the coverage of each 
AirDefense sensor (~40,000–60,000sq.ft.).   
AirDefense can provide a real-time depiction of WLAN connections, relations, 
performance, & usage throughout the network.  It is capable of maintaining an inventory 
of WLAN devices, and alerts to unplugged, stolen, or failing access points if the device 
has not been seen from the air within a designated period of time.  It has many different 
features.  AirDefense provides organizations with detailed information of devices that 
connect to each other and form ad-hoc networks.  It can also detect accidental 
associations and malicious associations.  Another interesting feat is how it can alert the 
                                                 
34 ReefEdge. Site Manager Software. [http://www.reefedge.com/reefedge/apm.do] Last accessed July 2004. 
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manager to excessive stations connecting to a single access point and excessive traffic 
between a single station and an access point and/or the wired network. 
A list of AirDefense’s wireless security capabilities are as follows:  
 
a. Detection of All Rogue Wireless LAN Devices & Activity  
 
• Access points  
• Wife user stations  
• Soft Access Points  
• Wireless bar code scanners  
 
b. AirDefense Also Identifies Rogue Behavior from:  
• Ad hoc networks  
• Peer-to-peer networking between user stations  
• Accidental associations  
 
c. Analysis of Rogue Connections 
 
 • Analyzes all connections made by rogue devices  
 
d. Risk & Damage Assessment  
 
• AirDefense tracks all rogue communication and provides forensic 
 information to identify:  
• When the rogue first appeared  
• How much data was exchanged  
•  The direction of traffic  
 
e. Intrusion Detection 
AirDefense utilizes its 24x7, real-time monitoring of 802.11a/b/g 
protocols for the most advanced intrusion detection for wireless LANs.  With stateful 
monitoring of all WLAN attack signatures, protocol analysis, statistical anomaly, and 
policy violations, AirDefense can identify: 
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Figure 3.13.  AirDefense Sensor. (From Ref. 35). 
 
(1) Attacks Against Wireless LANs. AirDefense correlates 
data across all sensors to identify attacks in recognized classifications and reduces false 
positives.  
   AirDefense recognizes documented and undocumented attacks 
including: 
• Identity thefts from MAC spoofing  
• Man-in-the-Middle attacks  
• Denial-of-Service Attacks  
• Denial-of-Service Attacks with Excessive MAC addresses  
• Dictionary attacks  
(2) Suspicious Activity & Impending Threats. AirDefense 
correlates information from all sensors over time to identify suspicious activity, such as:  
• Watch list stations/laptops entering the air space;  
• Repeated attempts by a station to connect with multiple APs  
• Anomalous traffic from unusual off-hours activity or large downloads35 
                                                 
35 AirDefense. Features. [http://www.airdefense.net/products/features/security.html]. Pg. 2-3. July 2004. 
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Figure 3.14. AirDefense Diagram.36 
 
F. SUMMARY 
By reviewing the equipment involved, along with the strengths and weaknesses 
with the software, it is possible to implement a WLAN into an MTF setting.  There are 
more security enhances being created to help prevent the theft of personal identification 
and other sensitive information from falling into the wrong hands.  Instituting the 
previous mentioned hardware and software can provide for a successful WLAN 
implementation. 
 
                                                 
36 Geroski, R. TechRepublic.com. AirDefense. Diagram. [http://techrepublic.com.com/5100-6264-1059473.html]. 
Pg. 1. August 2001. 
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IV. NAVAL MTF WLAN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A finding within the research of this paper showed an interesting model that could 
be used to help in the decision making process for implementing a WLAN.  A new 
approach to strategic management was developed in the early 1990's by Drs. Robert 
Kaplan (Harvard Business School http://www.hbs.harvard.edu) and David Norton 
(Balanced Scorecard Collaborative http://www.bscol.com).  They named this system the 
'balanced scorecard'.  The Supportability, Usability, and Security (SUS) Model developed 
by LCDR Joe Roth in his thesis is based as an extension of this framework to help bring 
order and strategy to the decision making criteria and to derive a successful wireless 
design and implementation.  Figure 3.15 shows the interlocking trinity of the model.37 
 
Figure 3.15. SUS Trinity Model (From Ref. 37). 
 
The three entities that make up the model provide the areas of focus when 
determining what is required by a WLAN in a decision making scenario.  Usability is the 
most important of the three.  The reason for this is because if the end user is not able to 
receive a continuous connection throughout the area of operation then there is no use in 
                                                 
37 Roth, Joseph L., Enterprise Implementations of Wireless Network Technologies At The Naval Postgraduate 
School and Other Military Educational Institutions. Master’s Thesis.  Naval Postgraduate School.  Monterey, 
California.  Pg. 69. September 2002. 
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having it installed.  It is the whole reason the system would be put into place.  
Supportability looks not into only provided trouble call support, but the maintenance and 
training of the WLAN by network personnel and end users is just as important and should 
not be overlooked.  As mentioned before, the basic security default of the WLAN is not 
the strongest.  Therefore, the system is dependent upon multiple layers of security that 
allow for it to operate on a larger scale throughout an MTF. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
1. Mission 
Navy Medicine, acting as a leading entity amongst DoD medicine will deploy and 
maintain an industry standard wireless network throughout its MTF facilities in order to 
provide quality patient care in this critical enabling technology. 
2. Assumptions 
To complete a requirement analysis, the following assumptions need to be made: 
 
•   Wireless technology will be supported by present and future technology. 
•   Connectivity via wireless is worth pursuing. 
•   Costs for wireless can be maintained at a controllable level. 
•   Security aspects and other related issues will have technical solutions to 
ensure that the wireless network is a valid network. 




a. Executive Leadership 
Based on the structure of the military MTF.  It is important to place 
emphasis on the Executive Steering Committees (ESC) of each MTF.  This group of 
individuals will determine the direction of their respective command and maintain overall 
responsibility for the apportionment and expenditure of allocated funds.  The ESC’s goal 
is to make decisions that focus on delivering the best patient care to the Fleet, while 
maintaining costs.  ESCs may not necessarily have the experience with wireless 
technology, but they may be persuaded to pursue wireless if it will help them achieve 
their mission goals.  
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b. Health Care Providers 
Health Care Providers are the focus behind the decision to implement 
wireless into Navy Medicine.  They have influence with executive leadership, can make 
suggestions, sit on committees, etc. This group will be on the forefront when using the 
wireless technology.  They will be able to perform many of their tasks while remaining 
mobile.  Some may have had experience using wireless technology within their private 
practice prior to joining the military.  This group will create the basis of the needs 
requirements for future wireless applications throughout each MTF based on their 
medical area of expertise. 
c. Administrators 
Administrators form another group of people within the MTF that can 
provide important feedback to the ESC in regards to wireless.  This could be considered 
the middle management of the MTF.  They offer another view of how wireless could be 
implemented on the administrative level.  This area of focus is based more on the 
maintenance of patient data (e.g. records, bills, etc.). 
d. Network Managers 
Network managers are responsible for the overall effectiveness and 
security of the network operation.  This group is the most technically savvy of all 
stakeholders.  They can see the value of wireless, and make it a goal of the proposed 
future network.  Network managers are generally in favor of new and innovative ideas, 
and wireless is one of those.  
e. External Stakeholders 
In the wireless domain, industry is a stakeholder.38 Navy Medicine will 
not be developing or buying any Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) solutions towards 
wireless, therefore, it is dependent upon the market. External stakeholders that are 
involved are regulatory agencies which Navy Medicine must be in compliance with. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Roth, Joseph L., Enterprise Implementations of Wireless Network Technologies At The Naval Postgraduate 
School and Other Military Educational Institutions. Master’s Thesis.  Naval Postgraduate School.  Monterey, 




The staff are the group of users responsible for carrying out the day to day 
operations of the MTF.  They are experts in their respected fields, and can benefit from 
the wireless technology provided throughout the MTF.   
4. Requirements  
The requirements for the use of a wireless network are as follows: 
a. Mobility 
Many of the MTFs have effective wired networks. Wireless networks will 
piggy back off of the original wired network, which will allow more users access to 
resources without being fixed in one location.  
b. Accessibility  
A wireless network will provide access to areas that were considered 
unavailable due to physical standards.  This is a more affordable solution to renovating an 
area with cables and possible physical alterations to the walls, ceiling, etc.  
c. Availability 
As mentioned with mobility, the addition of a wireless network will 
increase the networks availability by helping to reduce in the loss of connectivity. 
d. Bandwidth 
It is important to have a considerable amount of bandwidth when working 
with medical operations.  With a larger the amount of bandwidth, the greater the capacity 
to perform radiology and other medical department functions via a mobile PC.  802.11x 
does not share the same amount of bandwidth as a wired network, but as technology 
develops the ability to increase the bandwidth wirelessly improves.   
e. Ease of Use  
A wireless network offers usability without the need for bulky equipment.  
C. REQUIREMENTS MATRIX 
1. Location 
The idea behind this paper is to provide a basic guide, or template, for all Naval 
MTFs to integrate a wireless network into their current network architecture.  Each 
facility is different then the next, thus a generic template must be created.  Areas that may 
be involved are the main hospital or clinic, along with the outlying supply or other 
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satellite buildings that support the main building.  The locations encapsulate the overall 
end user population of each MTF in which the system is intended for.  Table 2 provides 
an overview of what is required within the network matrix. 
         
Geographic Coverage 
The wireless system shall cover the entirety 
of the main building that represents the 
Naval MTF, and provide an agile/evolvable 
capability to allow for the inclusion of its 
satellite buildings if needed. 
Hardware/Software 
Systems that are chosen for the 
implementation/integration should be 
proprietary products.  They shall be 
interoperable, and conform to wireless 
industry standards, along with DoD policies 
and directives.   
Availability 
Access points that are placed throughout 
the MTF shall overlap approximately 50% 
with one another to provide a 99.9% 
availability. 
Security 
All equipment shall use WEP, WPA, and 
other forms of security tools and measures 
that comply with all specified directives 
and policies that apply. 
Quality of Service (QOS) 
The goal of QOS will be to provide 100% 
service to all end users that depend upon its 
ability to provide mobility throughout day 
to day operations. 
 
Bandwidth, Latency, and Packet Loss 
Each MTF will have to explore on its own 
requirements to determine what will be 
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require to ensure Quality of Service (QOS)  
and Service Level Agreements.  An 
example of how it should be presented is as 
follows: 
(During peak hours, data rates shall 
maintain a minimum rate of 56 Kbps 
regardless of data type or format.  Network 
capacity shall support no less than 25% of 
the current population of personnel working 
at that MTF prior to performance 
degradation.  System latency shall be no 
more than 70 – 100 msecs, while packet 
loss will be limited to no more than .5%.) 
Scalability 
Each system chosen should be scalable 
enough to meet the requirements of the 
greatest capacity each MTF may provide 
personnel wise.  Provisions should be made 
for the future implementation/integration of 
satellite buildings. 
Table 2.   Requirements Matrix. 
 
2.  Hardware/Software 
The system designed will be intended to provide wireless access to end users 
throughout the MTF.  Do to the nature of an MTF it would be beneficial to use 
proprietary hardware and software to ensure that bugs or the possibility of non-
interoperability does not occur.  The appropriation of access points must rely on the 
ability to use proprietary, enterprise designed APs as well.  The differences between the 
typical Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) AP and the enterprise version are price and 
end user capacity.  SOHOs are cheaper in cost, and may seem to be more cost effective, 
but they cannot support large numbers of simultaneous users, provide management 
software to interact with other APs, or provide a more secure functionality.  Savings 
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would not last long, and costs would reoccur more frequently providing more difficulty in 
configuring, security, and end user satisfaction.  By using a proprietary enterprise access 
point vendor the ability to control all their APs from a single web interface, as well as 
perform security patches and upgrades, would allow the network to perform more 
smoothly.   
D. COST BENEFITS  
The bottom line is still the dollar.  Whether it is in the form of reducing the 
amount of hardware, or increasing provider output, the benefit of deploying a WLAN is 
still measured quantitatively.  When looking at the amount of time saved by allowing the 
health care provider to see their patients it is obvious that wireless can play an important 
role in health care.  By reviewing the metrics of a health care provider, one would be able 
to forecast an expected larger percentage of patients seen due to the lack of down time 
used when inputting data into the system via a stationary position (e.g. desktop PC).   
The idea of reducing costs is also evident when the reduction of installing cable 
and drop boxes throughout the facility are reduced.  On average the cost for installing a 
drop box can range from $75 to $200 depending on location and vendor.  The following 
information provided by recent studies help in determining whether or not it is beneficial 
to use wireless.   
1. Wireless Can Enhance the Return on Investment for Naval MTFs 
Another benefit is the real-time application that is provided by allowing the health 
care provider the ability to perform patient care on a continuous basis throughout their 
shift.  Placing the power of the new enterprise systems into the hands of the medical staff 
without disrupting the natural process of care will produce many dividends.  First of, the 
attraction of wireless mobile computing will accelerate the adoption of the new systems 
by clinicians.  Wireless will help the staff to accomplish more tasks in a shorter amount 
of time, to remove redundant process steps, and to increase the accuracy and immediacy 
of the patient and clinical information that’s captured and communicated.  The resulting 
increase in productivity and decrease in errors will help to lighten workloads that are too 
high now, to increase the quality of patient safety and care, and to accelerate and magnify 
the return on investment (ROI) of the new enterprise systems. 
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2. Wireless LAN Benefits Study by NOP World-Technology and Cisco 
Systems 
Cisco Systems and NOP World-Technology studied over 400 organizations in a 
variety of industries including healthcare39.  In terms of an ROI on productivity alone, 
this study found that wireless LAN (WLAN) use in healthcare was responsible for a 
savings of over $17,000 per employee per year.  In surveying end users for wireless 
LANs in healthcare, this study found that the most cited benefits included flexibility 
(anytime, anywhere access), mobility (within the building or campus), time savings, and 
error reduction.  They go on to report that users in healthcare stated that they are “almost 
50 % more accurate in their everyday tasks.”40  Figures 15 through 25 identify the key 
areas for determining wireless usage for MTFs.  Even though there appears to be quite a 
few figures, it is important to notice how each of these figures provides key information 
as to where wireless is moving, along with who is benefiting from its use. 
Figure 4.1 shows the overall penetration of WLANs into various areas of industry, 
education, and government.  Healthcare/Medical is still breaking through the barriers. 
 
Figure 4.1.  2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
                                                 
39 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology and Cisco Systems. 
[http://www.cisco.com/application/pdf/en/us/guest/products/ps4570/c1031/cdccont_0900aecd800cf91f.pdf]. November 
2003. 
40 NETEAM. Making a Case for Wireless Technology in Patient Safety. Pg. 7. March 2004. 
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Figure 4.2 shows what proportion of employees in each specific area has access to 
a WLAN.  It also shows future projections of that accessibility.  By 2005 approximately 
fifty percent of healthcare will be implementing some sort of wireless network within its 
own infrastructure. 
 
Figure 4.2.  2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
 
Figure 4.3 shows who has access to these WLANs.  Notice how ‘Nursing Staff’ 
has a larger percentage of accessibility than do doctors or emergency personnel. 
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Figure 4.3.  2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
 
Figure 4.4 shows how healthcare is placing WLANs into production at a greater 
capacity then previously.  By 2005 more than eighty percent of the healthcare entities 
studied will be utilizing a working WLAN. 
 
Figure 4.4. 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
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Figure 4.5 shows the time table used to predict when the average roll-out will be 
for each industry.  Over fifty percent of the healthcare entities studied plan to roll out a 
working WLAN within the next year. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the mean time hours for extended connection use per employee 
using WLAN.  Notice that between government and healthcare entities the hours of 
connectivity have increased fastest. 
 
Figure 4.6. 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
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Figure 4.7 shows the how much time has been saved since implementing a 
WLAN in each industrial area.  According to this study healthcare is the greatest 
benefactor of this savings. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
 
As mentioned before, the annual cost savings per employee using wireless is quite 
noticeable.  The most noticeable savings in Figure 4.8 is in the healthcare/medical realm. 
 
Figure 4.8. 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
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Figure 4.9 shows that by using a WLAN healthcare productivity has increased by 
almost a third within the past couple of years. 
 
Figure 4.9. 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
 
In Figure 4.10, out of all the healthcare entities studied, forty-three percent of 




Figure 4.10. 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 
and Cisco Systems (After Ref. 54). 
 
Last, Figure 4.11 shows that throughout healthcare an increase in accuracy of fifty 
percent.  This is quite a significant increase to the welfare and safety of the patient. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits Study. NOP World-Technology 





3. Gartner Group Estimates of Wireless LAN ROI 
Kenneth A. Kleinberg, a vice president and research director for Gartner Group, 
made a presentation at the 2003 Annual HIMSS Conference and Exhibition that stated 
estimated ROI figures for mobile computing in healthcare41 (see Table 3 below). 
 
Table 3.   Gartner ROI for Wireless/Mobile Computing in Healthcare. 42 
 
4. Wireless LAN Association (WLANA) 
The Wireless LAN Association (WLANA) submitted a report that discussed the 
benefits of implementing a WLAN.  The following information is derived from their 
report. 
a. Major Findings 
This Wireless LAN Cost of Ownership report is focused on the results of a 
detailed end-user survey to identify cost of ownership and tangible and intangible gains 
in using wireless LAN technology.  It is apparent that the technology is taking its place as 
a viable alternative and/or complement to wired LANs and for new strategic applications.  
 
• 89% of the companies experienced a successful implementation.  
                                                 
41 NETEAM. Making a Case for Wireless Technology in Patient Safety. Pg. 7. March 2004. 
42 Kleinberg, K. Mobile Healthcare: Applications, Vendors and Adoption. 
[http://www.himss.org/content/files/proceedings/2003/Sessions/session102_slides.pdf]. Last accessed July 2004. 
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• 92% of respondents interviewed believe there is a definite economic and 
business benefit after installation.  
• 92% of respondents reported that they will continue to deploy wireless 
technology in their network through 2000 because of the benefits 
experienced by end users and/or IT staff.  
• Payback was less than one year, across all industries surveyed.  
The survey combines both telephone and written responses from 34 
organizations.  The survey consisted of both open-ended and multiple-choice questions.  
It was designed to provide the Wireless LAN Alliance (WLANA) with as broad a 
response base as possible regarding specific costs, attitudes and experiences with their 
overall wireless LAN ownership.  All of the respondents involved subsequently 
completed a more extensive, follow-up written survey. Companies, schools, and medical 
facilities were assured anonymity.  The analysis that follows identifies only by industry 
category and reports the data in the mean.    
Some important findings are listed below:  
b. Real-Time Access to Information 
One of the consistent findings of this study was how end-users benefited 
from real-time information.  In fact, 97% of respondents said they either strongly agree or 
agree that the wireless LAN contributed to the speed in which they completed a task 
requiring real-time or near real-time access to information.  
c. Cost of Ownership 
The study compared the costs of 34 wireless LAN installations.  Costs for 
applications, outsourcing and network management are critical factors that need to be 
considered before the wireless LAN can either supplement the wired LAN or replace it as 
a wired LAN alternative.  These savings are substantial from the viewpoint of 
manufacturer, retailers, hospitals, schools, and financial organizations.  A wireless LAN 
enables them to provide better quality goods, at reduced costs, in a significantly less time.   
On average, the total cost per user was found to be $4550 for a wireless 
LAN solution. This includes the costs identified below (Note that the WLAN 
Hardware/End User Devices category includes the computing platform used, which was 
generally a handheld or laptop computer.) Wireless LAN infrastructure and end user 
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devices account for the highest percentage cost out of this total. The percentages for 
wireless LAN expenses, by category, were as follows:  
• WLANA Hardware/End User Devices: 50%  
• Monthly expenses: 1%%  
• Management expenses: 16%  
• Application development expenses: 16% Outsourcing: 16% Downtime: 
1%  
d. Economic Benefits  
With large investments in wireless LAN technology at approximately 
$300,000 to $4.2 million dollars per year, we clearly realize and sympathize with the 
managers that have been struggling to quantify the benefits that derive from wireless 
LANs.    Organizations implementing an average of 300 client cards reaped annual 
savings of up to $4.9 million, which translated into per user savings of $15,989.  As the 
wireless LAN solution is implemented on a large scale, these savings will eventually 
trickle down to the consumer.  
e. Payback 
Across all industries, the wireless LAN paid for itself within 12 months 
time.  This is with all economic benefits considered.  The payback period of this 
investment is the period of time required for the cumulative cash flows due to increased 
productivity, organizational efficiency and extra revenue/profit gain to equal the initial 
investment.  
 




company(millions $) 5.6 2.2 .94 2.5 .5  
Costs per 
company(millions $) 4.2 1.3 .90 1.3 .3 
Payback(# of months) 9.7 7.2 11.4 6.3 7.1 
 
Figure 4.12. Cost Benefit Analysis. (Payback) (From Ref. 43). 
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With fast-rising healthcare costs, reimbursement and ROI are key to the 
requirements of IT investments in the medical industry.  Healthcare spending in the U.S. 
has grown from $280 billion in 1981 to more than $1.5 trillion in 1997 and currently 
accounts for about 14% of the total gross domestic product.  Due to healthcare costs 
increasing at a rate of about 5% per year, cost containment is an important issue. 
Hospitals are centralizing laboratories, reducing costs, and increasing their use of 
automated technology.  The wireless LAN has shown to meet the technology and 
organizational needs of healthcare companies today by decreasing the length of hospital 
stay, speeding diagnostic and case analysis time turnaround, reducing hospital labor, 
procedural costs, documentation, and scheduling time. 43 
E. NETWORK DIAGRAM 
1. Basic Architecture 
Figure 4.14 is an example of how a standard WLAN architecture would look like.  
This is an example that an MTF can follow.  A wireless network session will start with 
the wireless client establishing a connection with an access point within range.  The 
negotiated session will be 128-bit WEP or WPA enabled. Further, if implemented, the 
access point will verify the client’s MAC address to ensure it is authorized to access the 
network.  At the same time, the RF monitor will detect the presence of the client and the 
access point and log appropriate audit information (i.e., MAC addresses, date/time 
detected).  If the RF monitor detects any unauthorized MAC addresses, the event will be 
logged and a system administrator alerted as soon as possible (e.g., pager, e-mail).  This 
alert mechanism could be accomplished by connecting the RF monitor with the local 
Network Operations Center (NOC).  The switch/hub is not required for any security 
functions in this architecture; it is simply a pass-through device.  The client will then 
authenticate itself with the access control device.  The credentials in this transaction 
should be either certificate- or two-factor-based.  The access control device will consult 
the authentication server for verification of the user’s credentials and to provide 
authorization details.  Regardless of whether the provided credentials are valid, 
                                                 
43 Wireless LAN Association (WLANA). Wireless LAN Cost of Ownership Report. 
[http://www.wlana.org/learn/roi.htm.]  Last accessed July 2004. 
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appropriate audit information (credentials, MAC address, date/timestamp) shall be logged 
by the authentication server.  After authentication is complete, an encrypted tunnel will 
be generated between the access control device and the wireless client. The tunnel will be 
terminated at those devices and not extended to other devices.  At this point, the wireless 
client has a secure connection to the internal network and should have access to any 
resources for which it has been authorized.  For all LAN activity, a network intrusion 
detection system will monitor the network for suspicious traffic (i.e., possible attack 
scenarios including port scans, denial of service /syn floods).  In addition, it will verify 
system integrity (e.g., system file changes) and log any auditable events.44 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Basic Architecture (From Ref. 55). 
 
F. SUMMARY 
By looking at the data provided it can be seen that Naval Medicine can profit 
from incorporating WLANs into their current wired networks to provide greater 
redundancy along with cost savings.  The studies show that it is possible to implement a  
                                                 
44 DoD, DISA, Wireless Security Support Program. Wireless LAN Security Framework. Pg. 4-8 &– 4-9. January 
2004. 
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WLAN without too much difficulty and receive an ROI within a year.  Those who would 























V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that WLAN technologies will be a part of every Naval MTF’s daily 
operations.  Many major hospitals throughout the United States have deployed 802.11 x 
technologies throughout their medical facilities.  It is obvious that 802.11x will play a 
major role in the Naval MTF information system network architecture. 
The needs and requirements for the deployment of 802.11x WLANs throughout 
all Naval MTFs focuses on the personnel that will be affected by the utilization of the 
network.  These individuals are the main personnel who will conduct the day-to-day 
operations of the MTF that range from patient care, administration, to executive 
functions.  The risks involved include the security of patient data, along with many other 
functions that exist beyond the scope of patient care.   
The architectural design of the network is basic from the start.  It will follow the 
basic wireless network setup and piggy back off of the original wired LAN.  The needs 
and requirements for each MTF will determine any changes to the original design.   
The benefits of developing and deploying a WLAN into the Naval MTF 
information network architecture is based on both physical and financial principles.  The 
physical side offers less hardware infrastructure; therefore it is much more mobile 
throughout the MTF.  The financial side offers a considerable savings and return on 
investment by cutting installation costs throughout. 
The most important issue towards the deployment of WLANs in MTFs is policy. 
It can be its biggest proponent as well as its worst critic.  Policy determines whether or 
not these networks will be arriving anytime soon.  It plays a major factor in every aspect 
of government, and this is seen by the prohibition towards the use of WLANs in the past 
few years.  Even though there are directives that specify the usage of the equipment it is 
still left up to the Designated Approving Authority of that region to decide who or what 
can be deployed at each respective command.  This can be read in the messages in 
Appendix C and D, which are provided by COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA.   
Naval MTFs now have the opportunity to deploy these networks throughout their clinics.   
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The DoD Directive 8100.2, April 14, 2004, signed by Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, allows for the use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf products to be 
used in DoD.  Next, MTFs must follow the guidelines laid out in the Health Insurance 
and Portability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to protect patient data that is maintained and 
distributed electronically.  As long as the equipment complies with the previously 
mentioned directive and act, and meets the security requirements, they may be purchased 
and used.   
From the data collected by the various papers, books, and articles, the use of 
802.11x wireless LANs throughout Naval MTFs is possible.  It is a cost effective method 
of providing the needed technology so health care providers, administrators, and 
executives can use it to optimize their MTFs performance.  With the development of 
faster, smarter, more manageable equipment, WLANs are sure to grow within the MTFs.  
This, in turn, gives health care providers the necessary means to provide faster and more 
accurate patient care.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following areas are for further research in regards to the development and 
deployment of WLANs in MTFs: 
• 802.16 and its application towards MTFs and mobile medical platforms. 
• Explore further issues of security and compliance with HIPAA. 
• Explore the latest versions of tablet PCs and how they, along with  
software can provide a more efficient work place for health care providers. 
• Creation of a comprehensive BUMED policy that provides guidelines for  









The 7 Layers of the OSI Model 
 
The OSI, or Open System Interconnection, model defines a networking framework for 
implementing protocols in seven layers. Control is passed from one layer to the next, 
starting at the application layer in one station, and proceeding to the bottom layer, over 
the channel to the next station and back up the hierarchy.  
Application 
(Layer 7) 
This layer supports application and end-user processes. Communication 
partners are identified, quality of service is identified, user 
authentication and privacy are considered, and any constraints on data 
syntax are identified. Everything at this layer is application-specific. 
This layer provides application services for file transfers, e-mail, and 
other network software services. Telnet and FTP are applications that 
exist entirely in the application level. Tiered application architectures 
are part of this layer. 
Presentation 
(Layer 6) 
This layer provides independence from differences in data 
representation (e.g., encryption) by translating from application to 
network format, and vice versa. The presentation layer works to 
transform data into the form that the application layer can accept. This 
layer formats and encrypts data to be sent across a network, providing 




This layer establishes, manages and terminates connections between 
applications. The session layer sets up, coordinates, and terminates 
conversations, exchanges, and dialogues between the applications at 
each end. It deals with session and connection coordination. 
Transport 
(Layer 4) 
This layer provides transparent transfer of data between end systems, or 
hosts, and is responsible for end-to-end error recovery and flow control. 
It ensures complete data transfer. 
Network 
(Layer 3) 
This layer provides switching and routing technologies, creating logical 
paths, known as virtual circuits, for transmitting data from node to node. 
Routing and forwarding are functions of this layer, as well as 




At this layer, data packets are encoded and decoded into bits. It 
furnishes transmission protocol knowledge and management and 
handles errors in the physical layer, flow control and frame 
synchronization. The data link layer is divided into two sublayers: The 
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Media Access Control (MAC) layer and the Logical Link Control (LLC) 
layer. The MAC sublayer controls how a computer on the network gains 
access to the data and permission to transmit it. The LLC layer controls 
frame synchronization, flow control and error checking. 
Physical 
(Layer 1) 
This layer conveys the bit stream - electrical impulse, light or radio 
signal -- through the network at the electrical and mechanical level. It 
provides the hardware means of sending and receiving data on a carrier, 
including defining cables, cards and physical aspects. Fast Ethernet, 
RS232, and ATM are protocols with physical layer components. 
 






                                                 











































ALCOM # 046-04 
 
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA/-/JUL// 
 
SUBJ/ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORK (WLAN) 
MORATORIUM// 
 










NARR/REF A IS THE ASHORE WIRELESS CESSATION MORATORIUM MSG, REFS B AND C 
ARE THE COMPACFLT/COMFLTFORCOM MSG CESSSATION OF WIRELESS LOCAL AREA 
NETWORK INSTALLATIONS IN COMPACFLT AND COMLANTFLT SHIPS, REF D IS USE OF 
COMMERCIAL WIRELESS DEVICES, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES IN DOD GRID, REF E IS 
MANAGEMENT OF AFLOAT COMBAT 
 
80 
SYSTEMS AND C4I INSTALLATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS// 
 
POC/GRETCHEN MERRYMAN/CDR/NNWC DEPUTY DAA/LOC:NAB LTLC/TEL:757-417-
7912/EMAIL:GRETCHEN.MERRYMAN(AT)NAVY.MIL// 
 




RMKS/1.  PER REFS A THROUGH C, NEW WIRELESS 802.11 SYSTEMS/EQUIPMENT CANNOT 
BE PROCURED OR IMPLEMENTED, ASHORE OR AFLOAT WITHOUT OBTAINING APPROVAL 
FROM COMNAVNETWARCOM.  IAW REF D, COMNAVNETWARCOM, AS THE NAVY DAA, 
HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROLLING WIRELESS ACCESS TO NAVY INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS TO ENSURE 
 
THAT THESE SYSTEMS (INCLUDING EXTERNAL INTERFACES TO COMMERCIAL WIRELESS 
SERVICES) DO NOT INTRODUCE VULNERABILITIES THAT UNDERMINE THE ASSURANCE 
OF INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS.  THE SCOPE OF THIS MORATORIUM INCLUDES BUT IS 
NOT LIMITED TO COMMERCIAL WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR DERIVATIVES, AS 
STANDARDIZED IN IEEE 
 
STANDARDS 802.11, 802.15 AND 802.16 COMMERCIAL WIRELESS DEVICES, SERVICES, AND 
TECHNOLOGIES, VOICE AND DATA CAPABILITIES, THAT OPERATE EITHER AS PART OF 
THE NAVY IT ENTERPRISE NETWORK OR STAND-ALONE SYSTEMS.  THIS INCLUDES BUT IS 
NOT LIMITED TO PARA 2.3 OF REF D: 
 
    A. WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES THAT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS MORATORIUM 
ARE AS FOLLOWS: A) THOSE THAT CAN PERMIT ACCESS TO NAVY INFORMATION 
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SYSTEMS WITHOUT TRANSITING AN EXISTING WIRED NETWORK ACCESS INTERFACE FOR 
REMOTE CONNECTIVITY, B) THOSE THAT CAN PROVIDE ACCESS TO UNCLASSIFIED DATA 
STORED ON PORTABLE OR STATIONARY ELECTRONIC DEVICES, AND C) THOSE THAT DO 
NOT PROTECT THE PRIVACY AND INTEGRITY OF DATA IN TRANSIT (I.E. TRANSMITTING 
OFFICIAL EMAIL INFORMATION IN THE CLEAR WITHOUT APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHY). 
PER PARA 4.1.2 OF REF D, EXCEPTIONS MAY BE GRANTED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS 
DETERMINED BY THE NAVY DAA. 
 
    B. WHAT IS NOT IN THE SCOPE OF THIS MORATORIUM AS OUTLINED IN PARA 2.5 OF REF 
D: CELLULAR VOICE PHONES, COMMERCIAL PACKET RADIO TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN A 
NAVY LAN AND A PED THAT 1) DOES NOT STORE INFORMATION, 2) PROTECTS ALL 
TRANSMISSIONS, AND 3) ACCESSES THE NAVY LAN THROUGH AN EXISTING, APPROVED 
WIRED, REMOTE NETWORK ACCESS SERVICE. 
 
2.  CURRENTLY DEPLOYED WIRELESS NETWORKS AND WIRELESS EXTENSIONS TO WIRED 
NETWORKS MAY CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNDER EXISTING APPROVED IATO/ATO.  
HOWEVER, THEY MUST BE REGISTERED NLT 30 AUG 2004. REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED 
IAW PARA 3.  IN ADDITION TO PARA 3, COMNAVNETWARCOM HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO 
IDENTIFY, APPROVE AND ENSURE ALL WIRELESS DEVICES ARE OPERATING IAW REF D.  
EXISTING SSAA'S, IATO' S AND ATO'S MUST BE SUBMITTED FOR REGISTRATION VIA EMAIL 
TO THE COMNAVNETWARCOM POC IN PARA 5. 
 
3.  APPROVAL/WAIVER/REGISTRATION SUBMISSION FOR NEW OR EXISTING WIRELESS 
SYSTEMS MUST BE VIA NAVAL MESSAGE WITH A SUBJECT LINE OF "WIRELESS 
APPROVAL/WAIVER/REGISTRATION" TO COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA/NSD/ USING 
THE SAMPLE A-O FORMAT BELOW IAW REF E. 
 
    A.  COMMAND NAME, UIC, LOCATION OF NETWORK (BASE, BUILDING, ROOM) 
82 
 
    B.  CURRENT OR PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE INCLUDING: TYPE OF HARDWARE, 
SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, IDS OR OTHER SECURITY FEATURES, SPECIFIC ENCRYPTION 
ALGORITHM UTILIZED, AND CLASSIFICATION OF DATA TO BE PROCESSED (SUBMISSION 
OF EXISTING SSAA WILL SUFICE) 
 
    C.  JUSTIFICATION OF WIRELESS CAPABILITY (PURPOSE OF INSTALLATION) 
 
    D.  OPERATIONAL IMPACT IF NOT INSTALLED 
 
    E.  PREREQUISITE REQUIREMENTS (I.E. SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING, TEMPEST, 
HERO, HERF, RFI) 
 
    F.  TESTING ACCOMPLISHED FOR APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION BY APPROPRIATE 
TECHNICAL AGENT (NAVSEA, SPAWAR, PEOS, ETC) 
 
    G.  SCHEDULE (TO INCLUDE LENGTH OF TIME FOR TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS, PROOF 
OF CONCEPT/DEPLOYMENT DATE) 
 
    H.  INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 
 
    I.  TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
 
    J.  IMPACT TO EXISTING SYSTEMS 
 
    K.  RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
    L.  CONTINGENCY (OPTIONS/FALL BACK) 
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    M.  DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 
 
    N.  INTEROPERABILITY IMPACT 
 
    O.  POINT OF CONTACT, EMAIL AND PHONE NUMBER 
 
4.  WAIVER REQUEST SUBMITTED TO THIS MORATORIUM WILL BE CONSIDERED ON A 
CASE-BY-CASE BASIS VIA MSG AND MUST BE APPROVED IN WRITING BY THE NAVY DAA. 
 
5.  POC FOR REGISTRATION AND DOCUMENTATION IS: LEIGH 
ARMISTEAD/CIV/COMNAVNETWARCOM/LOC:NORFOLK VA/TEL:757-417-7914 EXT 
1/EMAIL:EDWIN.ARMISTEAD(AT)NAVY.MIL OR CARRIE 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
85 
APPENDIX D 
R 021619Z JUL 04 
FM COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA 
TO ALCOM 
ENT/OU=DOD/OU=NAVY/OU=ADDRESS LISTS(UC)/CN=AL ALCOM(UC) 
INFO ZEN/COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA 
DON CIO WASHINGTON DC 
UNCLAS 




ALCOM # 038/04 
THIS IS A NUMBERED ALCOM. 
PASS TO OFFICE CODES 
INFO COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA//CIO/NSD// 
DON CIO WASHINGTON DC//CIO// 
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA/-/JUL// 
SUBJ/WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORK (WLAN) ASHORE MORATORIUM// 
REF/A/GENADMIN/COMPACFLT/192206ZAUG2003// 
REF/B/GENADMIN/COMFLTFORCOM/021742ZAPR2004// 
NARR/REFS A AND B ARE COMPACFLT/COMFLTFORCOM MSG CESSATION 
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OF 
WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORK INSTALLATIONS IN COMPACFLT AND 
COMLANTFLT SHIPS// 
POC/GRETCHEN MERRYMAN/CDR/NNWC DEPUTY DAA/LOC:NAB LTLC 
/TEL:757-417-7912/EMAIL:GRETCHEN.MERRYMAN(AT)NAVY.MIL// 
POC/DONALD KERRIGAN/CAPT/NNWC DAA/LOC:NAB LTLC/TEL:757-417-6740 
/EMAIL:DONALD.KERRIGAN(AT)NAVY.MIL// 
RMKS/1.  REFS A AND B PROVIDED AN INITIAL MORATORIUM ON 
SHIPBOARD 
WLANS. NAVNETWARCOM CONCURS WITH THE NEED TO SECURE THE 
NAVY 
ENTERPRISE AGAINST WLANS VULNERABILITIES.  THIS MESSAGE 
EXTENDS THE 
WLAN MORATORIUM TO ALL ASHORE COMMANDS AND ENTERPRISES 
INCLUDING 
BLII, NMCI, AND LEGACY NETWORKS.  THIS MORATORIUM WILL REMAIN 
IN 
EFFECT UNTIL SECNAV AND NAVNETWARCOM ISSUE POLICIES ON 
SECURING 
WLANS IN THE DON ENTERPRISE. 
2. WIRELESS SIGNALS ARE RADIO TRANSMISSIONS THAT CAN BE 
INTERCEPTED 
OR INTENTIONALLY JAMMED AND/OR EXPLOITED.  EXPOSURE OF DATA IS 
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NOT 
THE ONLY WLAN CONCERN FOR THE NAVY.  IF IMPROPERLY 
IMPLEMENTED, A 
WIRELESS NETWORK ALLOWS AN UNAUTHENTICATED OR 
UNAUTHORIZED USER 
ACCESS TO THE NETWORK. 
3. THIS MORATORIUM APPLIES TO ALL 802.11 WIRELESS INSTALLATIONS 
AND 
EQUIPMENT THAT OPERATE IN THE ISM OR UNII FREQUENCY BANDS 
WHICH 
COVER 900 MHZ, 2.4 GHZ AND 5.8 GHZ. 
4. EXCEPTIONS TO THIS MORATORIUM WILL BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE 
BY 
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